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NOTE
CLOSING THE LOOPHOLES IN THE
REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES:
THE NEED FOR CONGRESS TO
REEVALUATE MEDICAL DEVICE
REGULATION
Michael VanBurent
INTRODUCTION
Recent high-profile failures of medical devices manufactured by
Guidant' and other companies have highlighted the need to revisit
medical device regulation. These are not isolated instances. The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) estimates that problems with medical
devices cause 300,000 deaths and injuries a year.2 The FDA, which is
responsible for the pre- and post-market regulation of medical de-
vices, bills itself as the "Nation's Foremost Consumer Protection
Agency."3 Despite the Agency's proclaimed role as a consumer pro-
tection advocate, the FDA has lost sight of that goal regarding medical
devices. The current statutory and regulatory scheme for medical de-
vices is rife with loopholes that place patients at increased risk of in-
jury or death. The FDA has become willing to trade careful
pre-market review of medical devices for a quicker introduction of
new devices into the market. This Note proposes that Congress should
reevaluate the current statutory and regulatory scheme in which the
J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 2007;
M.A., The George Washington University, 2004; B.A., Vanderbilt University, 2002.
' See, e.g., Barry Meier, Internal Turmoil at Device Maker as Inquiry Grew,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at Al.
2 Ross Kerber, FDA Halts Expansion of Network to Monitor Medical Device
Safety: Agency Backs Off Goal of Linking 500 Hospitals to System Aimed at Early
Detection of Problems, BOSTON GLOBE, July 14, 2005, at Dl.
3 FOOD & DRUG. ADMIN., DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA's GROWING
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE YEAR 2001 AND BEYOND (2001),
http://www.fda.gov/oc/opacom/budgetbro/budgetbro.htm.
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FDA functions to determine whether an alternative statutory frame-
work for approving medical devices would better protect medical de-
vice users.
Part I of this Note outlines a factual situation involving a recent
lawsuit against a hospital and Steris, a device manufacturer, as well as
a factual situation involving Guidant, a manufacturer of pacemakers.
The Steris lawsuit was in response to an infection outbreak traced to a
sterilizer for bronchoscopes that affected several patients. The nature
of the device defects discussed in Part I illustrates some of the current
problems facing the FDA and the consumers it is supposed to protect.
Part II describes the different pre-market processes the FDA uses to
ensure new medical devices are safe and effective before allowing
device manufacturers to market them. That section will also discuss
the policy rationales behind the pre-market controls and some of the
problems they raise. Part III examines some of the post-market con-
trols in place that are intended to ensure that a device remains safe and
effective once on the market. It also raises some of the issues that un-
dermine the ability of the FDA to effectively regulate devices on the
market. Part IV suggests proposals for reforming the current system of
medical device regulation.
I. FACTUAL SCENARIO: FAULTY DEVICES SLIPPED
THROUGH REGULATORY SYSTEM CRACKS
According to news reports, a bacterial outbreak occurred among
sixteen patients at Allegheny General Hospital (AGH) in Pittsburgh in
the fall of 2002.4 One patient died as a result of the infection.5 The
hospital claimed the infections resulted from problems with a bron-
choscope cleaning machine manufactured by Steris, the System I
sterilizer.6 The hospital alleged two problems with the device. First
the hospital argued that the filters that were supposed to sterilize the
water used to wash the bronchoscopes were ineffective.7 Second,
Steris allegedly failed to provide adequate notice about defects in
connectors that attached the bronchoscopes to the sterilizer, and the
hospital was not adequately notified of the recall of the connectors.8
4 See, e.g., Christopher Snowbeck, AGH Blames Sterilizer Maker for Out-
break That Killed 1, Sickened 15, PrrrSBURGH POST-GAZErrE, Jan. 22, 2003, at B8,
available at http://www.post-gazette.com/healthscience/20030122scopes4.asp.
5 id.
6 Id. Bronchoscopes are "small, flexible tubes about the width of a pencil
that are threaded through a patient's nose or mouth into the upper airways and lungs."
Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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Steris could not produce letters documenting that it communicated the
recall information to the hospital. 9
The hospital further alleged that the FDA had previously ex-
pressed concerns to Steris regarding the bronchoscope cleaning ma-
chine filters and connectors.' ° Steris claimed it addressed FDA
questions about the filters in 2002, and the FDA failed to follow up on
Steris's response. Steris considered the issues resolved." The hospital
also claimed that Steris interfered with attempts to investigate the
source of the outbreak; a Steris representative visiting the hospital
allegedly removed the sterilizer filters and threw them in a sink, which
made testing impossible.12
Steris, in turn, blamed the hospital, stating that its "analysis...
indicated the cause was improper hospital operating procedures in
using the equipment."'13 The company also stated it was unaware of
any other hospitals ceasing to use the sterilizer.'
4
The FDA investigated the dispute between Steris and the hospital
but ended its investigation in May 2003 without reaching a decision.
The agency could not "pinpoint a cause for the outbreak."'15 Frus-
trated, two groups of patients and their families sued the hospital for
negligence in March 2004.16 The groups also alleged negligence
against Steris.
17
Interestingly, in April 2003, a former Steris employee, Larry Jos-
lyn, made allegations echoing the hospital's argument that defects in
the sterilizer resulted in bronchoscopes becoming contaminated. 1 In a
suit for wrongful discharge, Joslyn alleged that Steris's sterilization
system failed to "properly sterilize hospital equipment as represented
in label claims" because of "a systematic contamination problem."'
9
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 See id.
13 Id.
14 Luis Fabregas & Marisol Bello, Finger-Pointing Follows AGH Deaths,
PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Oct. 12, 2003,
available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/tfibune-review/specialreports/
hospital/s_159477.html.
15 Id.
16 Luis Fabregas, AGH Is Sued Over Deadly Outbreak, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-
REV., Apr. 14, 2004, available at
http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/search/s_ 189219.html.
17 Id.
18 Christopher Snowbeck, FDA Unable to Decipher Bacterial Outbreak at
AGH, PrrTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 14, 2003, at A3, available at
http://www.post-gazette.com/healthscience/20030514 fda05 14p5.asp.
19 Complaint at 7, Joslyn v. Steris Corp., No. CV 03 499847 (C.P. Cuyahoga
2007]
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Joslyn further alleged that Steris destroyed evidence as a result of
Joslyn voicing concerns about the risk posed by Steris's sterilization
products.20
More troubling are allegations that Steris was already aware of the
concerns raised by Joslyn. During the course of his employment, Jos-
lyn allegedly learned that Steris System 1-the system at issue in the
AGH case-did not properly sterilize hospital equipment.2' Joslyn
also allegedly learned that this issue had already been raised by regu-
lators.22 Upon meeting with a Steris vice president to discuss the prob-
lems with System 1, Joslyn claims he was told that Steris was aware
that "sterilization inadequacies had resulted in the sale of adulterated
and misbranded products. 23 Joslyn further alleges that he was told
24
upper management was aware of this problem.
In 2004, a group of patients at Stanford Hospital in California
may have been exposed to tuberculosis after a Steris sterilization ma-
chine used to sterilize endoscopes failed to work properly.25 The ma-
chine apparently failed to function on certain days.26 While the risk of
exposure to tuberculosis was very slight, after contacting the state
Department of Health Services, the hospital learned that eleven other
hospitals in California had experienced the same problem. 27 While the
County Dec. 16, 2003).
20 Id. at 3.
21 Id. at 7.
22 Id.
23 Id. For a definition of adulterated and misbranded in this context, see 21
U.S.C. §§ 351-52 (2006). Adulterated devices include devices "prepared, packed, or
held under insanitary conditions," devices that do not conform to FDA good manufac-
turing practices or performance standards, and devices for which an application for
pre-market approval was not timely filed or approved or has been suspended. 21
U.S.C. § 351(a)(1), (e), (f)(1)(A-B) & (h) (2006). A device is considered mislabeled
"[i]f its labeling is false or misleading in any particular." 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2006).
24 Complaint, supra note 19, at 7. Joslyn later filed a notice of dismissal, and
the case was dismissed with prejudice. Journal Entry, Joslyn v. Steris Corp., No. CV
03 499847 (C.P. Cuyahoga County Dec. 16, 2003). Three months prior to the dis-
missal, though, the parties failed to appear for a case management conference. Journal
Entry, Joslyn v. Steris Corp., No. CV 03 499847 (C.P. Cuyahoga County Sept. 11,
2003). A motion to continue the case management conference was filed based on a
tentative settlement agreement. Id. Regardless of why Joslyn filed a notice of dis-
missal, his complaint contains serious allegations that are particularly relevant given
their similarity to those made by the plaintiffs in the Allegheny General Hospital case.
25 Dave Murphy, 92 Patients Told of Possible Exposure to TB: Medical
Devices in Hospital Surgeries Weren't Sterilized, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 2005, at B4,
available at
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2005/02/ 1I/
BAG6CB9KAK 1 .DTL&type=printable.
26 id.
27 id.
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results of the sterilization machine failure at the Stanford Hospital
differed from those at Allegheny General Hospital, the same equip-
ment appears to have failed at both places (and possibly others).
The failure of the Steris devices shows the harmful, and even
deadly, consequences of the approval and market placement of defec-
tive devices. It also highlights the flawed nature of a regulatory sys-
tem that approves such devices. The Steris device was approved
through the 510(k) pre-market notification process, a streamlined ap-
proval process that allows a device manufacturer to get the FDA ap-
proval needed to market the device quickly.2 8 Less than a year after
Steris submitted its application to the FDA for approval to market the
bronchoscope sterilization system, the FDA found the device to be
substantially equivalent 29 to a predicate device and approved it.3° The
device was then placed on the market.
While the Steris case suggests that pre-market controls were in-
adequate to protect patients, the case of Guidant heart devices demon-
strates the inadequacy of post-market controls to ensure device safety.
Defects in heart devices manufactured by Guidant are alleged to have
resulted in seven known deaths due to short circuits. 31 Guidant re-
called the devices in June of 2005, after coming under criticism for
not promptly warning physicians and patients about the risk of short
circuits.32 But, as early as 2002, Guidant had learned that one of its
heart devices was prone to short-circuiting. This raises serious ques-
tions about whether Guidant took any precautions regarding the pos-
sibility of other heart devices short-circuiting after it knew of the
problem.3
3
The Steris and Guidant cases indicate that defective, and deadly,
devices are surviving the FDA approval process and are being mar-
keted to health care providers. The failure of the FDA to notice and
28 See infra pp. 10-13.
29 Substantial equivalence is one of the primary mechanisms in the 510(k)
process for ensuring the safety and effectiveness of medical devices. See infra pp. 13-
18.
30 CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., 510(K) PREMARKET NOTIFICATION DATABASE (2007),
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPMN/pmn.cfm?ID= 14106.
"Approval" in this context means that the device is "substantially equivalent" to an-
other device that is similar to yet another device marketed prior to 1976. 21 U.S.C. §
360e(b)(1) (2000). This implicitly means the approved device is, among other things,
safe and effective. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(2) (2000).
31 Barry Meier, More Deaths Are Linked To Device, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2005, at C 1.
32 Id.
33 Id.
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remedy such defects is a function of the shortcomings of the regula-
tory scheme for medical devices.
II. PRE-MARKET CONTROLS ON MEDICAL DEVICES
The 1976 Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) split medical devices into three
categories: Class I, Class II, and Class III devices. 34 Class I devices
pose "little or no threat to public health. 35 Class II devices "pose a
threat to public health . . . but are not generally life-threatening. ' 36
Tongue depressors are an example of Class I medical devices, while
tampons are an example of Class II devices.37
This Note is primarily concerned with Class ml devices. A Class
I1 device is one that (a) cannot be classified as a Class I or II device
because the FDA lacks information to determine if general or special
controls are adequate to ensure its safety and efficacy and (b) is in-
tended to be used to support human life or perform an important func-
38tion in maintaining health or poses a high risk of illness or injury.
14 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (2000).
35 Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, Meeting the Objectives of the MDA: Implied
Preemption of State Tort Claims by the Medical Device Amendments, 10 J.L. &
HEALTH 343, 345 (1995); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A) (2000).
36 Radwan, supra note 35, at 345; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B) (2005).
37 Radwan, supra note 35, at 345.
3' 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2000). The entire definition of a Class III
device:
Class 1II, Premarket Approval.--
A device which because--
(i) it (I) cannot be classified as a class I device because insufficient informa-
tion exists to determine that the application of general controls are sufficient
to provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the de-
vice, and (II) cannot be classified as a class II device because insufficient
information exists to determine that the special controls described in sub-
paragraph (B) would provide reasonable assurance of its safety and effec-
tiveness, and
(ii)(I) is purported or represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining
human life or for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing im-
pairment of human health, or
(I) presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury,
is to be subject, in accordance with section 360e of this title, to premarket
approval to provide reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness.
If there is not sufficient information to establish a performance standard for
a device to provide reasonable assurance of its safety and effectiveness, the
Secretary may conduct such activities as may be necessary to develop or
obtain such information.
[Vol. 17:441
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An example of a Class III device is a pacemaker 39 (or a sterilization
device). Class III devices are subject to pre-market approval,4 ° while
Class I and II devices are not.
41
By their nature, then, Class III devices are more dangerous and
possess greater potential for helping patients than other classes of de-
vices. As such, any regulatory scheme designed to ensure device
safety must have ensuring the safety and effectiveness of Class III
devices as a primary goal.
Medical device manufacturers face a choice between two options
when applying for pre-market approval from the FDA to market their
devices. The manufacturers can choose the pre-market approval
(PMA) process or the pre-market notification (5 10(k)) process.
A. Pre-market Approval (PMA)
The pre-market approval process is intended to evaluate the
safety and effectiveness of class III devices. Given the "level of risk
associated with Class III devices," the FDA has determined that "gen-
eral and special controls" are not enough to ensure the safety and effi-
cacy of Class III devices.42 PMA, then, is required for Class III
devices pursuant to §515 of the FDCA (unless, as discussed below, a
5 10(k) application may be submitted for the device instead).43
The requirements for submitting a PMA are substantial. The FDA
has 180 days from receipt of an application to review the application
and decide whether to approve or deny the application or send an "ap-
provable" or "not approvable" letter to the applicant.44 The PMA ap-
plication must satisfy a lengthy list of requirements.45 Examples of the
requirements include: summaries of non-clinical laboratory studies
and clinical studies involving human subjects; an explanation of de-
vice functioning; alternative practices or procedures that would also
accomplish the goal of the device; the history of the marketing of the
device by the applicant and other manufacturers, if known; a detailed
description of the device; a bibliography of all reports that the appli-
cant knows about or should reasonably know about regarding the
39 Radwan, supra note 35, at 345.
40 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) (2000).
41 See id.; 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2004).
42 CR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMiN.,
PREMARKET NOTIFICATION 510(K): REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR MEDICAL
DEVICES, 1-6 (1995).
43 Id.
44 21 C.F.R. § 814.40 (2006).
45 See 21 C.F.R. § 814.20 (2005). Section 814.20 includes a list of require-
ments that is over five pages long.
2007]
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safety or effectiveness of the device; and an environmental assess-
ment.
46
The burden placed on Class III device manufacturers and the FDA
is heavy. This explains why the less burdensome and more flexible
510(k) process has become favored by the medical device industry
and the FDA.4 7
B. Pre-market Notification (5 10(k) Process)
The pre-market notification process is known as the 510(k) pro-
gram after the original section of the FDCA dealing with pre-market
notification. A manufacturer intending to introduce a medical device
into commercial distribution is required to submit a pre-market notifi-
cation, or 510(k), to the FDA at least ninety days before distribution is
to begin.48 There are two possible outcomes of the FDA 510(k) review
process that result in approval of a device. First, a device is approved
if it is found to be substantially equivalent to a similar device-known
as a predicate device-that was sold prior to 1976.49 Second, a device
is approved if found to be substantially equivalent to another device
that was found to be substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device
through the 510(k) process. 5
0
46 id.
47 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 479-80 (1996). In 1983, a
House Report found that 1,000 out of about every 1,100 Class III devices that had
been placed on the market since 1976 were approved through the 510(k) process. By
1990, eighty percent of Class III devices were still being introduced to the market
through the 510(k) process. Id. (citing SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE H. COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., MEDICAL DEVICE
REGULATION: THE FDA's NEGLECTED CHILD 34 (Comm. Print 1983); H.R. REP. No.
101-808, at 14 (1990)).
48 CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., THE NEW 5 10(K) PARADIGM-ALTERNATE APPROACHES TO DEMONSTRATING
SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN PRE-MARKET NOTIFICATIONS-FINAL GUIDANCE 1
(1998); see also 21 U.S.C. § 360(k) (2000).
49 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1) (2000). The entire text of 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)
(2000) states:
(1) In the case of a class III device which--
(A) was introduced or delivered for introduction into interstate com-
merce for commercial distribution before May 28, 1976; or
(B) is (i) of a type so introduced or delivered, and (ii) is substantially
equivalent to another device within that type, the Secretary shall by
regulation, promulgated in accordance with this subsection, require
that such device have an approval under this section of an application
for premarket approval.
Id.
50 CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, supra note 42, at 2-1.
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Congress designed the 510(k) process to be less strict than the
PMA process. 5' Because Congress sought to avoid withdrawing exist-
ing medical devices from the market while the FDA completed the
new PMA analysis for them, pre-1976 devices were permitted to re-
main on the market until the FDA initiated and completed a PMA for
the devices.52 Congress was concerned that device manufacturers of
such "grandfathered devices" would monopolize the market while
new devices waited to complete the PMA process and wanted to en-
sure improvements to existing devices could reach the market
quickly. 53 Devices "'substantially equivalent' to pre-existing devices,"
then, were permitted to avoid the PMA process.54 Congress's intent in
creating the 510(k) process to circumvent the PMA scheme appears to
have been to create a short-term solution to ensure devices were avail-
able to consumers.
In contradiction to the apparent intent of Congress, the "over-
whelming majority" of new-model devices are approved through the
510(k) process.55 This process has been described as "a relatively
speedy and efficient procedure for pre-market review and quasi-
approval.56 One scholar notes that "the process has become so rou-
tine that a new transitive verb has emerged in medical device
regulatory parlance: 'to five-ten-K' a device, meaning to obtain a sub-
stantial equivalence determination for a new-model product upon
submission of a section 510(k) pre-market notification." 57
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted the device industry's heavy re-
liance on the 510(k) process to place devices on the market quickly
and easily. 58 Device manufacturers have embraced the relative speed
with which a device can be approved through the 510(k) process.59
While a PMA review takes an average of 1,200 hours to complete, the
§ 510(k) process only lasts an average of twenty hours. 60 The Court
quoted one commentator, who summarized the situation: "The attrac-
tion of substantial equivalence to manufacturers is clear. [Section]
51 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477-78 (1996).
52 Id.
" Id. at 478.
54 Id.
55 Robert B. Leflar, Public Accountability and Medical Device Regulation, 2
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 28 (1989).
56 Id. (quoting Richard M. Cooper, Clinical Data Under Section 510(k), 42
FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 192, 193 (1987)).
57 Leflar, supra note 55, at 28.
58 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 479.
59 See id. at 480.
60 Id. at 478-79.
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510(k) notification requires little information, rarely elicits a negative
response from the FDA, and gets processed very quickly."
6
'
The FDA has also come to embrace pre-market notification.
While Congress believed the FDA would be capable of quickly com-
pleting the PMA process for Class 1II devices, "the substantial in-
vestment of time and energy necessary for the resolution of each PMA
application, the ever-increasing numbers of medical devices, and in-
ternal administrative and resource difficulties" precluded the FDA
from keeping up with the "rigorous PMA process. 62 Section 510(k)
submissions, in contrast to PMAs, do not require consultation with an
advisory panel, and the FDA does not need to oversee the preparation
of a summary of the device's safety and effectiveness. 63 Determina-
tions of substantial equivalence, moreover, are very rarely subjected
to administrative or judicial review. 64
The primary problem with the 510(k) process is the speed and
flexibility it allows device manufacturers in placing devices on the
market. While this speed and flexibility may be hailed by many as
means of allowing manufacturers to quickly provide devices to hospi-
tals and patients, the reality is that it creates a large regulatory loop-
hole that manufacturers exploit in great numbers. The results are
devices being placed on the market that average only twenty hours of
FDA review.65 The policy issue raised is whether, having imposed a
governmental regulatory scheme, Congress should allow the FDA to
spend less than three working days examining a Class Im device that
can sustain human life or pose an unreasonable threat to life. Given
that the FDA itself estimates that 300,000 deaths and injuries a year
occur from medical devices, 66 the rational answer seems to be no.
61 Id. (quoting Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step
in the Right Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG
CosMETIc L.J. 511, 516 (1988)).62 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 479.
63 Leflar, supra note 55, at 48.
64 id.
65 As discussed below, device manufacturers, obviously, must test the device
internally before submitting notification to the FDA, and post-market control meas-
ures exist. The issue remains, though, whether twenty hours of pre-market review is
adequate to protect patients.
66 Testimony Before S. Comm. on Appropriations Subcomm. on Agriculture,
Rural Development, and Related Agencies, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Bernard
Schwetz, Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, Food and Drug Admin.). This
statistic does not distinguish between devices approved through the PMA process and
the 510(k) process. It is worth emphasizing, though, that the majority of devices
placed on the market are approved through the 510(k) review process.
[Vol. 17:441
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C. Substantial Equivalence
The substantial equivalence requirement for approving new de-
vices is one of the only pre-market controls included in the 510(k)
process.67 As such, this determination plays a key role in ensuring
device safety and efficacy. The FDA may issue an order of substantial
equivalence after determining the device at issue "is as safe and effec-
tive as a legally marketed device., 68 As part of demonstrating substan-
tial equivalence, the FDA requires device manufacturers to submit the
following with its 510(k) notification: For a device that a manufac-
turer claims is substantially equivalent to a Class HI predicate device
that was marketed prior to 1990, the manufacturer must submit (1) a
summary of any safety and effectiveness problems associated with the
type of devices to which the proposed device is being compared and
(2) certify that it has searched all information known about the device
and similar devices. 69 These requirements, clearly, are far less burden-
some than those required for the more stringent PMA process.7°
Examining the evolution of the concept of substantial equivalence
illustrates some of the problems in relying on the determination of
substantial equivalence to ensure device safety and efficacy. As noted
earlier, the 1976 amendments focused on whether a device was sub-
stantially equivalent to a device already on the market in 1976.71 But
the 1976 regulatory scheme generated complaints from observers. The
most troubling aspect of the old substantial equivalence requirement
was that it "untenably postpone[d] the law's requirement that all Class
III devices go through the process required to provide a reasonable
67 See Benjamin A. Goldberger, The Evolution of Substantial Equivalence in
FDA's Premarket Review of Medical Devices, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 317, 337 (2001).
While substantial equivalence was originally intended to be a "minor feature" in the
new 510(k) scheme, it has become the FDA's "primary gatekeeping criterion for
medical devices. Although Congress ultimately approved the dominance of this stan-
dard, it is a standard adopted more out of necessity than planning." Id.
68 CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, supra note 48, at 1. ("Sec-
tion 513(i) of the Act states that FDA may issue an order of substantial equivalence
only upon making a determination that the device to be introduced into commercial
distribution is as safe and effective as a legally marketed device ... FDA has, how-
ever, discretion in the type of information it deems necessary to meet those content
requirements. For example, to allocate review resources more effectively to the high-
est risk devices, FDA developed a tiering system based on the complexity and the
level of risk posed by medical devices. Under this system, the substantial equivalence
determination for low risk devices is based primarily on descriptive information and a
labeling review, while the decision for higher risk devices relies on performance
data").
69 21 C.F.R. § 807.870) (2006).
70 See supra p. 238.
71 See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 478 (1996).
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assurance of safety and effectiveness" 2 -it did not require devices to
immediately undergo PMA review. The idea of a "'no worse than
1976' marketing threshold" did little to protect device users, since the
safety and effectiveness of many pre-1976 predicate devices had not
been shown by scientific studies. 73 New products that were "substan-
tially equivalent to dross [were] likely to be dross themselves. 74 In
other words, unlike the PMA process, the 510(k) process did not pro-
vide satisfactory assurances of a device's safety and effectiveness.
The reason for this was that the pre-1976 device that the new device
was linked to was never sufficiently shown to be safe and effective.
This problem of the uncertainty over a device's safety and effec-
tiveness was exacerbated by the idea of "equivalence creep:" the FDA
allowed a new device to be approved "as long as its sponsor could
trace its ancestry to a device on the market before 1976 and [] the
equivalency chain was not interrupted by . . . 'unanswered questions'
of safety and effectiveness. 75 The FDA, moreover, approved products
where the manufacturer "had traced different aspects of the product to
different predicate devices," leaving the device with "only a distant
resemblance to the preenactment devices to which it was supposedly
substantially equivalent., 76 Not only was the safety and effectiveness
of the predicate device in doubt, but the new device might not even
have been directly related to that device or any pre-1976 device.77 The
FDA's substantial equivalence determination, then, may have said
absolutely nothing about the safety and effectiveness of the device.
In 1990, Congress attempted to address some of these problems
with the 510(k) process by enacting the 1990 Safe Medical Devices
Act (SMDA). The SMDA required the FDA to obtain PMAs for Class
HI pre-enactment devices. 78 The SMDA also forced a manufacturer
arguing that a new device is substantially equivalent to a pre-1976
device that has never been approved through the PMA process to
search for all information available on the device's safety and efficacy
and reference any adverse findings. 79 The SMDA further required the
FDA to issue a formal order declaring that a new device is substan-
72 Leflar, supra note 55, at 32-33.
73 Id. at 33.
74 id.
71 Id. at 51.
76 Id.
77 Goldberger, supra note 67, at 325.
78 Id. at 326-27.
79 Howard M. Holstein & Edward C. Wilson, Developments in Medical
Device Regulations, in 2 FUNDAMENTALS OF LAW AND REGULATION: AN IN-DEPTH
LOOK AT THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS 257, 267 (David G. Adams, Richard M. Cooper &
Jonathan S. Kahan eds., 1997) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)).
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tially equivalent to a predicate device before it can be placed on the
market.8°
While these provisions seem to represent a step forward in ensur-
ing device safety, however small it might be, the SMDA also retreated
a step: it created the current substantial equivalence scheme that al-
lows manufacturers to claim substantial equivalence to any device that
was on the market prior to 1976 or to a device that has been shown to
be substantially equivalent to a pre-1976 device.81 A device with "dif-
ferent technological characteristics" is still substantially equivalent to
a predicate device if information submitted with it indicates that the
device is as safe and effective as a predicate device and does not pre-
sent new questions of safety and effectiveness.82 Now any type of
legally marketed device may serve as a predicate device; a device
manufacturer no longer has to look to a pre-1976 device.83 While the
SMDA created some new protections for device consumers, then,
such as requiring pre-1976 devices to be submitted to the PMA proc-
ess and requiring manufacturers submitting a 510(k) notification to
cite adverse findings, it also reduced the already light burden on de-
vice manufacturers to demonstrate substantial equivalence.
Under the SMDA, the FDA is still limited in what information it
can request to show that devices with differing technological charac-
80 Id.
8' Holstein & Wilson, supra note 79, at 267 (citing 21 U.S.C. §
360c(i)(1)(A)(ii)(II)).
82 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(A)(1)(ii)(2000).
83 Goldberger, supra note 67, at 326; see also 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii),
360e(b) (2006). 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii) (2006) describes the substantial equiva-
lence determination process:
(i) Substantial equivalence.
(1)
(A) For purposes of determinations of substantial equivalence under
subsection (f) and section 520(1) [21 U.S.C. § 360j(l)], the term "sub-
stantially equivalent" or "substantial equivalence" means, with respect
to a device being compared to a predicate device, that the device has
the same intended use as the predicate device and that the Secretary by
order has found that the device--
(i) has the same technological characteristics as the predicate de-
vice, or
(ii) (I) has different technological characteristics and the informa-
tion submitted that the device is substantially equivalent to the
predicate device contains information, including appropriate
clinical or scientific data if deemed necessary by the Secretary or
a person accredited under section 523 [21 USCS § 360m], that
demonstrates that the device is as safe and effective as a legally
marketed device, and (II) does not raise different questions of
safety and effectiveness than the predicate device.
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teristics are substantially equivalent. The FDA can only request in-
formation that is necessary to making the substantial equivalence
determination and must consider the "least burdensome means of
demonstrating substantial equivalence and request information ac-
cordingly." 84 This means that most manufacturers submit pre-clinical
data rather than clinical data,85 using laboratory studies rather than
testing on human subjects, for example.86 The emphasis on substantial
equivalence also encourages manufacturers to focus device testing on
demonstrating substantial equivalence. Such testing does not have
much value outside of the 510(k) process. 87 The Food and Drug Ad-
ministration Modernization Act of 1997 reinforced this last problem
by limiting FDA data submission requirements to information regard-
ing substantial equivalence only.88
The lack of public accountability in the process of determining
substantial equivalence also undermines the ability of the 510(k)
process to protect the safety of device users. The review for substan-
tial equivalence is an internal agency process that is not open to the
public, and no public record of the proceedings exists.89 Unlike the
PMA process, substantial equivalence decisions are not accompanied
by summaries regarding the device's safety and effectiveness. 90
Moreover, the FDA does not release information about product per-
formance, leaving device purchasers without reliable information
upon which to base purchasing decisions.91 Both the public and device
users, such as health care facilities, then, are unable to review the de-
cision of the FDA regarding one of the key safeguards of the 510(k)
process.
While the public at large may not wonder about the transparency
of a substantial equivalence determination or the safety and effective-
ness of devices,92 health care administrators and personnel are likely
to be motivated to investigate the safety and efficacy of medical de-
vices. The inability of such providers to obtain information to evaluate
the functionality of a device can limit their ability to effectively serve
those in their care. But, at the same time, consumer culture may put
' 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(D) (2000).
85 Goldberger, supra note 67, at 330.
86 See Leflar, supra note 55, at 11.
87 Goldberger, supra note 67, at 330.
88 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(D)).
89 Leflar, supra note 55, at 33.
9 Id.
91 Id.
92 Roger W. Bivans, Note, Substantially Equivalent? Federal Preemption of
State Common-Law Claims Involving Medical Devices, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1087, 1087
(1996).
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pressure on health care providers to embrace the latest medical device
technology in spite of a lack of information regarding the device's
safety and effectiveness.93
The Steris case highlights the problems with relying on substantial
equivalence for 510(k) approval. The facts surrounding the failure of
the sterilization equipment suggest that some aspect of the System 1
sterilizer was defective. The manufacturer, moreover, may have
known about the defects and concealed them. The FDA was not able
to determine what caused the illness at AGH. Substantial equivalence
review precluded the FDA from inquiring too closely into the func-
tioning of the System 1. The patients and health care providers at
AGH and Stanford hospital, then, were left without adequate regula-
tory protections to help ensure the devices they were using were safe
and effective, and no method to independently investigate and evalu-
ate the information submitted to the FDA.
D. Another Type of 510(k) Process: The Special 510(k) for Device
Modifications
The regulatory scheme for device modifications is even less bur-
densome than the 510(k) process for new devices. The FDA's 1998
guidance document regarding the "New 510(k) Paradigm" introduced
the concept of the "special 510(k)," which is an additional 510(k)
process for approval of device modifications.94 Device manufacturers
are required to submit a new 510(k) for device modifications that
could "significantly affect safety and effectiveness. 95
Manufacturers may create an internal design control system to
form the basis of this substantial equivalence determination. 96 Device
modifications are subject to the submission requirements of 21 C.F.R.
§ 807 and the design control requirements of 21 C.F.R. § 820.30.97
Device manufacturers must have "a systematic set of requirements
and activities for the management of design and development, includ-
ing documentation of design inputs, risk analysis, design output, test
procedures, verification and validation procedures, and documentation
of formal design reviews. In this process, the manufacturer must en-
sure that design input requirements are appropriate so the device will
93 Judy Foreman, Book Review: Hope or Hype: The Obsession with Medical
Advances and the High Cost of False Promises By Richard A. Deyo and Donald L.
Patrick, 352 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1615, 1615-16 (2005).
94 CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, supra note 48, at 3; see also
Goldberger, supra note 67, at 329.
CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, supra note 48, at 3.
96 Id.
97 id.
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meet its intended use and the needs of the user population."98 The
design specifications resulting from this testing form the basis for the
device master record which is subject to inspection by the FDA.99 But
the manufacturers are free to perform this testing internally.
Based on this internal testing, a device manufacturer may then de-
cide that a device modification does not require a new 5 10(k) submis-
sion. A manufacturer can use the FDA guidance document "Deciding
When to Submit a 510(k) for a Change to an Existing Device" to guide
this decision.1°° In deciding whether to submit a new 510(k), the
modified device may be compared to a device of the manufacturer
that has already been cleared, a more recent legally marketed version
of that device, another manufacturer's device, or a pre-1976 device.' 0 '
Changes in a device must be compared collectively to other changes
made since the last 510(k). 10 2 When a particular change, considered
together with all previous changes since the last 510(k) clearance,
leads a manufacturer to conclude that it must submit a new 510(k), it
must submit a new 5 10(k) incorporating the changes.10 3
The guidance document includes several flowcharts (such as
"When to file a 510(k)," "Is it a labeling change?" and "Is it a tech-
nology or performance change?") to assist a manufacturer in deciding
when to submit a 510(k) for a device change. 1°4 The flowcharts lead
manufacturers to either "New 510(k)" or "Documentation. , 0 5 "New
510(k)" means "strongly consider submitting a new 510(k)," and
"Documentation" means "document ... analysis [of whether a new
510(k) is required] and file it for future reference."' 06 A manufacturer,
then, is free to change a device and make a decision not to notify the
FDA the device has changed. The manufacturer is only required to
document testing that is performed in order to show that the device
remains safe and effective. 10 7 Given the time and budget constraints
under which the FDA operates, the likelihood that the FDA will regu-
larly inspect the documentation of decisions not to submit new
510(k)s for modified devices is small. And while manufacturers might
98 Id.
99 Id.
10o CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., DECIDING WHEN TO SUBMIT A 5 10(K) FOR A CHANGE TO AN EXISTING
DEVICE (1997).
'0 Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
103 Id.
104 See, e.g., id. at 28-32.
105 Id.
'o Id.at 9.
107 Id. at 8.
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seem to have a market-based incentive not to sell updated devices
unless they are certain the modified devices are safe, the high number
of injuries and deaths that occur annually suggest that defective de-
vices are regularly placed on the market. Perhaps manufacturers rec-
ognize that the potential profits from placing a device on the market
sooner rather than later outweigh concerns about a potential defect
coming to light in a few years.
E. Regulatory "Blacklists"
The FDA was once able to use what device manufacturers charac-
terized as a blacklist to protect consumers. The blacklist consisted of
manufacturers in violation of the FDA's good manufacturing practices
(GMP) for devices. 0 8 The FDA would refuse to find substantial
equivalence for these manufacturers' devices and defer 510(k) ap-
provals until the manufacturers remedied the GMP violations. 1°9 Con-
gress explicitly outlawed this practice in Food and Drug
Modernization Act, except where the GMP violation "potentially pre-
sent[s] a serious risk to human health."'l 0 Congress believed "the
510(k) program [was] intended for premarket review determinations
and should not be used as an enforcement tool."''
The banning of an enforcement practice that ensured compliance
with GMP was unfortunate. The ease with which 510(k)s are granted
approval by the FDA, at least compared to the PMA process, does not
place much pressure on manufacturers to ensure their devices are truly
safe and effective. To require manufacturers to comply with GMP
before allowing devices to be sold would be a small and reasonable
step to protect device users.
Ill. POST-MARKET CONTROLS ON MEDICAL
DEVICES
The FDA's "relaxed, multi-level premarket review system" was
intended to be offset by the strict post-market surveillance system."
12
The pre-market review was meant to function as part of a system un-
der which the FDA would require device users to report defects and
problems and aggressively follow up on the reports. That, however, is
not the way the system actually works.
108 Goldberger, supra note 67, at 328.
109 Id.
110 Id.at 329.
111 Id. (citing S. REP. No. 105-43, at 29 (1997)).
112 LARS NOAH & BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY 256 (2002).
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A. Device Reporting
One means of post-market surveillance is the requirement under
the.MDA that all manufacturers submit medical device reports to the
FDA "whenever deaths, serious injuries, or dangerous malfunctions
occurred in association with the use of a medical device."'1 13 This re-
quirement was broadened in 1990 to require distributors and user fa-
cilities to file medical device reports. As a result, the number of
reports has increased dramatically. The FDA now receives more than
100,000 medical device reports a year." 14
This system sounds better in theory than it works in practice,
though. Physicians who encounter device problems are only required
to report deaths, not serious injuries, to the FDA. 15 Physician reports
of serious injuries are sent to device manufacturers who are then re-
sponsible for reporting the problems to the FDA.'1 6 The response of
manufacturers to such individual physician reports often is to blame
the physicians using the device. 17 Critics also argue the device manu-
facturers "downplay" the problem to the FDA." 8
B. MedSun
A solution to these difficulties that has interested the FDA is the
implementation of the Medical Device Surveillance Network (Med-
Sun), a computer network for reporting device problems that links
user facilities, such as hospitals." 9 MedSun uses a "representative
subset of user facilities to perform a more targeted and thorough col-
lection and investigation of' Medical Device Reports. 2 ° Physicians at
hospitals connected to the network use it to report problems with cer-
tain devices directly to the FDA. 12' The reports can then be forwarded
113 Id.
"14 Id. at 256-57; see 21 C.F.R § 803.10 (2005). Congress, however, later
exempted distributors from reporting requirements. NOAH & NOAH, supra note 112, at
273.
115 Kerber, supra note 2, at DI; 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b)(1)(A) (2005).
116 Kerber, supra note 2, at D1; 21 U.S.C. § 360i(b)(1)(B-C) (2005).
117 Kerber, supra note 2, at D1.
118 id.
119 NOAH & NOAH, supra note 112, at 273-74; see generally Neal I. Muni et
al., Challenges in Regulating Breakthrough Medical Devices, 60 Food & Drug L.J.
137, 139 (2005). "MedSun provides a secure, Internet-based data entry system that
automates [the reporting] process and helps gather other additional data that can help
FDA, device manufacturers, and clinical facilities proactively address safety concerns
before serious injuries or deaths occur." Welcome to MedSun,
http://www.medsun.net/about.html (last visited March 9, 2006).
120 NOAH & NOAH, supra note 112, at 274.
121 See Kerber, supra note 2, at D1.
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to the device manufacturer. 122 MedSun users are directed to enter a
brief description of the event, check a box specifying whether the re-
port is an initial one or a follow-up, and enter the date of the event.'
23
Participating health care facilities must commit to use MedSun for
twelve months and must appoint at least two representatives to use the
system.124 MedSun participants, but not other health care facilities,
receive a monthly newsletter summarizing the reports received in the
last month.
1 25
Despite the fact that the FDA aimed to connect 500 of the nation's
5,000 hospitals to the system, the Agency has stopped at 350 hospitals
and will not fund further expansion in the next several years.1 26 One
member of Congress argued that the lack of further funding is "con-
sistent with the pattern of the FDA under [the Bush administration], to
act in a way that is complicit with the entities they're supposed to
regulate." 127 The FDA, then, has foregone an opportunity to collect
reliable information directly from device users at a relatively low cost.
This is certainly not to say the MedSun reporting program is ideal.
It, for example, only sends monthly reports to participating health care
facilities, which does not help the majority of providers monitor de-
vice safety. But it would help the FDA track device problems, assum-
ing the FDA would decide to act on the reports received.
C. Audits
Given the reluctance of the FDA to gather information about de-
vice safety and effectiveness once a device is on the market, one
might expect the FDA to at least aggressively review the records that
device manufacturers are supposed to maintain regarding complaints,
complaint investigations, and decisions not submit a new 510(k) for
an updated device. FDA inspections of Class I device manufactur-
ers, by law, are supposed to occur every two years.'
28
But FDA inspections of complaint files, and likely other files,
have not been an effective regulatory method. Inspection of files is
labor-intensive and inefficient, and inspections every two years are
insufficient to discover many problems. Manufacturers, moreover,
122 MedSun, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.medsun.net/faq.asp#one (last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
123 MedSun, Sample Data Entry Page, http://www.medsun.net/sample.asp
(last visited Mar. 9, 2006).
124 MedSun, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 122.
125 id.
126 See Kerber, supra note 2, at D2.
127 Id. (quoting Congressman Maurice Hinchey).
128 21 U.S.C. § 360(h) (Supp. 2006); see also Leflar, supra note 55, at 38.
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have been working to minimize their record-keeping. 129 Considering
these problems, there is minimal value in having the FDA spend its
resources inspecting manufacturer files prior to a problem arising.
The post-market controls that the medical device regulatory
scheme depends on are insufficient. Problems with devices that cause
injuries and deaths often go unreported, and required inspections are
unlikely to turn up any problems.
IV. POSSIBILITIES FOR REFORM
Given the shortcomings in both pre-market and post-market regu-
lation of Class IIJ medical devices, Congress should revisit the medi-
cal device regulatory scheme again. An effective reform package
could be implemented that is not overly burdensome to device manu-
factures and requires only a slight increase in government funding of
the FDA.
First, Congress should leave the 510(k) process in place. For al-
most thirty years the process has provided a means for new and poten-
tially life-saving devices to reach the market and patients quickly.
While the relative speed of the 510(k) process, as compared to the
PMA, increases the likelihood of defective products reaching the mar-
ket, prolonging the approval process could delay the marketing of
breakthrough technology that could "fill a significant unmet clinical
need and/or offer substantial improvements to patient health compared
to existing therapies.,' 130 And requiring all devices to be submitted to
the PMA process could greatly slow the pace of technological devel-
opment in the field of Class Id medical devices. Congress, therefore,
should merely modify the 510(k) process and post-market processes
as a means of ensuring greater device safety.
The substantial equivalence process makes sense, despite the
shortcomings discussed earlier, because it efficiently allows a device
manufacturer to build on the work it or another manufacturer has
done. But Congress should provide the FDA with the discretion to
request information beyond that required for the least burdensome
means of showing substantial equivalence. Requiring manufacturers
to produce greater information is not necessary; the threat of the FDA
requesting more information-if it were backed up by real enforce-
ment-would be enough to encourage manufacturers to move away
from testing solely for substantial compliance and look more closely
at issues of safety and effectiveness. Requiring the FDA to consider
129 Leflar, supra note 55, at 38-39.
130 See Muni et al., supra note 119, at 138.
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more information could prove overly burdensome to the Agency. The
best option, then, is to allow the FDA to request more information
where it has concerns about the safety and efficacy of a device.
Second, Congress should provide the FDA with the discretion to
compile a list of manufacturers who violate the FDA's GMPs. If de-
vice manufacturers are to be permitted to continue to use the quick
and efficient 510(k) process for pre-market approval and the special
510(k) process for device modification (and be trusted to decide when
to submit a 510(k) for a device modification), device manufacturers
should be required to show that they can adhere to a minimum stan-
dard of safety. Observing the FDA's GMPs indicates the manufactur-
ers are willing to accept a basic duty to produce safe devices.
To show the potential effectiveness of such a sanction, consider
Guidant's response to the FDA's suspension of further approval of
some products due to a lack of "adequate controls, procedures[,] and
methods to validate product improvements it was making."'' Guidant
stated that "it would 'promptly respond to the warning letter"' imple-
menting the suspension and claimed it had already completed a major-
ity of the commitments it made following the FDA's inspection three
months earlier that identified the violations. 132 Given Guidant's quick
response once the suspension was implemented, 133 if the FDA were
allowed to compile a list of all manufacturers not in compliance and to
not process their applications until the violations were corrected, the
potential economic impact on manufacturers would likely result in
their becoming more diligent in observing good manufacturing prac-
tices.
The FDA, moreover, had sent a warning letter to Guidant a week
prior to the letter imposing the suspension threatening regulatory ac-
tions such as "seizure, injunction, and/or civil money penalties" with-
out notice. 134 But only a week later, the FDA moved to suspend
consideration of new applications rather than implement one of the
threatened regulatory actions. This suggests that the FDA believes that
suspending applications is an effective remedy for some violations. It
131 Vikas Bajaj, F.D.A. Puts Restrictions on Guidant, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28,
2005, at C 1.
132 Id.
133 It should be noted here that Guidant was in the midst of a bidding war
between two potential buyers in December of 2005. See id.
134 Letter from W. Charles Becoat, Dir., Minneapolis Dist., F.D.A., to James
M. Cornelius, Chairman & CEO, Guidant Corp., (Dec. 22, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/foi/waming-letters/g5657d.htm.
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also supports Dr. Sidney Wolfe's assertion that the current system of
civil fines is rarely used.
135
Third, to compensate for the 510(k) process, Congress should de-
sign a more effective post-market set of controls. The centerpiece of
post-market regulation should be the expansion of the MedSun pro-
gram to include a representative number of hospitals and other health
care facilities. Physicians and other health care workers use medical
devices daily and are likely to be the first to identify problems with
devices and/or defective devices. An effective MedSun program
would increase the ability of the FDA to learn of device defects
quickly. It would also reduce the need to make biannual inspections of
manufacturers.
Putting aside potential political objections to the MedSun pro-
gram, implementing such a program requires the FDA to invest such
scarce resources as money and time in setting up a computer network
and encouraging physician participation. The pilot MedSun program,
moreover, lagged far behind a similar program set up to monitor new
drugs. 136 But, interestingly, at least one reformer is not calling for
significantly greater expenditures for device reporting. Dr. Wolfe
points out that FDA "cheerleading" efforts significantly increased
physician reporting of adverse drug reactions.137 FDA officials re-
quested that physicians assist them in monitoring post-market drug
safety and supplied incentives such as gift certificates to encourage
participating in reporting programs. 38 Dr. Wolfe believes a similar
approach would successfully encourage physician participation in a
program such as MedSun. 39 The MedSun program, thus, should be
reborn as a voluntary, web-based reporting system, in which physi-
cians are encouraged to file device reports with the FDA directly.
While there is a minority view against requiring further device re-
porting, and the medical device industry does not like it,140 post-
market device reporting is the most efficient and effective way for the
FDA to learn about device problems. The alternative to such reporting
135 Sidney M. Wolfe, Dir., Public Citizen's Health Research Group, Roundta-
ble Discussion at Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Nov. 16, 2005);
see also Barry Meier, F.D.A. Says Flaws in Heart Devices Pose High Risks, N.Y.
TIMES, July 2, 2005, at C2.
136 See Marc Kaufman, Cardiac Devices May Need Replacing; Guidant Con-
firms Defects in Up to 28,000 Pacemakers, WASH. POST, July 19, 2005, at DOI.
137 Wolfe, supra note 135.
138 Id.
139 id.
140 Id.
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would be waiting for device failures, as in the case of the Steris ster-
ilization system or the Guidant pace makers.
An increased focus on device reporting should be coupled with ef-
forts to make the results of the reports more accessible to the public.
This would assist the medical community, and the general public, to
make better choices about which devices should be used in treating
health problems. The FDA also recently announced it would make
safety reports filed by device manufacturers more accessible to the
public, although it declined to provide details. 14 At the very least,
such a measure would encourage the FDA to be more diligent in
monitoring the safety information being provided by the device manu-
facturers.
Fourth, Congress should institute fines to ensure manufacturers
keep detailed files of complaints, testing results, and other data. Ran-
dom inspections should be made to enforce this policy. Such visits
would encourage manufacturers to maintain such records while mini-
mizing the amount of resources that would need to be spent for a new
program. The inspections would ensure that manufacturers are ade-
quately documenting decisions whether to submit new 510(k)s for
modifications for existing devices. It would also help ensure that
manufacturers have adequately researched substantial equivalence and
safety and effectiveness since complete evidence of such research
must be available to FDA officials.
Congress should also implement heavy punitive fines for defec-
tive devices where the manufacturer and/or its agent purposefully or
negligently manufactured a defective product. While the FDCA pro-
vides for remedies such as recall of and reimbursement for defective
devices, 142 additional protections are necessary. Heavy monetary fines
would place the burden on the manufacturer, rather than on the FDA,
to thoroughly test the device before submitting it to the FDA. This
would increase the reliability of the 510(k) process since only devices
that the company believes are safe and effective would be submitted
to the FDA. The purpose of such a measure would be to deter compa-
nies from intentionally placing defective products on the market, or
even continuing to market them. While civil suits might be expected
to have a similar deterrent effect, they are apparently not effective
enough since manufacturers like Guidant and Steris allegedly contin-
ued to market defective devices. Congress should create a presump-
tion in administrative proceedings that a manufacturer acted
141 Barry Meier, Plan to Require More Data on Safety Issues, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2006, at C13.
142 See 21 U.S.C. § 360h (2005).
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negligently and should be fined when a device is found to not be safe
or effective. Such a presumption could be rebutted by evidence show-
ing the manufacturer took reasonable precautions in terms of research
to ensure a device is safe and effective.
The counterargument to implementing such a penalty is that plac-
ing too great a burden on manufacturers will discourage them from
investing in the development of new life-saving technologies. But
such penalties would not result in a significant increase in the FDA
regulatory structure; it merely would serve as an enticement to device
manufacturers to use more care in conducting pre-market research. If
the manufacturer took reasonable precautions to ensure the safety and
effectiveness of the device, moreover, the manufacturer would avoid
paying the fine. A manufacturer merely is burdened to the extent that
it must act reasonably, which is not excessive given the potential harm
that can result from a defective product.
An alternative proposal would be to sanction individual employ-
ees responsible for a defective product being submitted to the FDA or
for providing deliberate misleading information that resulted in FDA
approval of the 510(k) device. If the FDA found an employee of a
device manufacturer was involved in deliberately providing mislead-
ing information to the FDA, the FDA could ban the employee from
working in the medical device industry for a period of time. 143 This
would be similar to the sanctioning approach used by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in punishing employees of NRC-
licensed companies.144
CONCLUSION
While some observers may be willing to trust the marketplace to
discourage device manufacturers from exploiting loopholes in the
device regulatory scheme and selling products that are less than com-
pletely safe and effective, the reality is that defective products make it
into commerce, such as in the case of the Guidant pacemakers and the
Steris sterilization systems. By providing a streamlined process for
approving medical devices but also implementing a means to discour-
age abuse of that system, some simple reforms could encourage
143 Implementing such a penalty as a result of negligence might be unduly
harsh given the burden that would be placed on such an employee in terms of finding
work after being barred from the medical device industry. Subjecting the manufac-
turer to fines for negligent or willful misconduct and barring individuals from the
industry for deliberate misconduct should be sufficient to discourage misconduct.
'44 See 10 C.F.R § 2.202 (2006); see, e.g., In re Steven Moffitt, IA-05-054
(Nuclear Reg. Comm. Jan. 4, 2006) (Order).
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manufacturers to quickly place safe and effective devices on the mar-
ket. Any decrease in speed would likely be accompanied by an in-
crease in device safety.

